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One important decision for a nation-state and an organization of nation-states is when to intervene to 
shore up a currency. For example, as a currency depreciates, imports may become more expensive and 
this can lead to inflation, higher interest rates, a stock market drop, even a recession as various 
domestic economic activities suffer. Also possible is a decreased sense of national self-worth when it is 
linked to the value of a currency. On the other hand, currency depreciation can lead to some positive 
consequences such as cheaper exports nurturing aspects of the domestic economy and, in some 
circumstances, attracting foreign investment and tourism. Various interactions of the negative and 
positive render the decision to intervene even more complex. 
 
Even when the decision to intervene is made, the probability of success--here, to increase a currency's 
value--is not easy to assess in a global economy. For example, the huge size of foreign exchange markets 
makes it quite difficult to assume that a significant government intervention to buy up its currency and 
sell others will be successful. According to conventional wisdom, the psychological conundrum of this 
difficulty is as follows. If there are sound market rationales for a currency's depreciation, government 
intervention will probably fail. If a currency's depreciation is based largely on some collective 
phenomenon variously termed "herd psychology" or "mass hysteria," government intervention will have 
a greater probability of success. In the former case, government intervention cannot contend with 
economic laws. In the latter, intervention can contend with psychological laws. 
 
However, how does anyone know for sure which of the two conventional scenarios apply? Individuals 
caught up in mass hysteria or a herd psychology usually do not believe that they are. They believe that 
there are lawful economic phenomena at work or even unlawful phenomena that in the future will 
qualify as law. Thus, the phenomenologies of people who are allegedly characterized by one of two 
conventional scenarios seem to be equivalent during a time of currency depreciation and deliberation of 
government intervention. Even after intervention has or has not occurred and the currency in question 
has or has not changed in value, the so-called lessons learned are equally captive to equivalent 
phenomenologies. Intervention success, failure, and the very causal status with currency value cannot 
be divorced from respective phenomenologies. 
 
Perhaps economics continues to be the dismal science because even in its quest for the objective and 
quantifiable it is only a tragic-comedic masquerade of human belief systems--systems that are touched 
to the quick with the irrational, the emotional, and the unconscious. (See Bonetti, S. (1998). 
Experimental economics and deception. Journal of Economic Psychology, 19, 377-395; Grasmuck, S., & 
Espinal, R. (2000). Market success or female autonomy?: Income, ideology, and empowerment among 
microentrepreneurs in the Dominican Republic. Gender and Society, 14, 231-255; Mueller-Peters, A. 
(1998). The significance of national pride and national identity to the attitude toward the single 
European currency: A Europe-wide comparison. Journal of Economic Psychology, 19, 701-719; Mueller-
Peters, A., et al. (1998). Explaining attitudes towards the euro: Design of a cross-national study. Journal 
of Economic Psychology, 19, 663-680; Ostaszewski, P., Green, L., Myerson, J. (1998). Effects of inflation 
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on the subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 5, 324-
333.) (Keywords: Currency, Economics.) 
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